NATO Deputy Secretary General Shekerinska in Paris: No to "Minsk 3.0" - Urges Military Aid for Ukraine
Shekerinska warned against a weak peace deal like "Minsk 3.0," stressed NATO-EU defense cooperation, and supported France’s defense budget hike to 3.5% of GDP. She also visited Istres-Le Tubé Air Base, highlighting NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy amid Russia’s war.
Last week, NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska visited Paris to discuss security priorities with senior French officials. During her visit, she underlined not only the urgent need for sustained military aid to Ukraine but also the necessity of learning from the past. “We cannot have a Minsk 3.0,” she declared, warning that any new peace deal resembling the previous Minsk agreements risks repeating a cycle of half-measures that—according to recent analyses—enabled Russia to consolidate its territorial gains without delivering lasting security for Ukraine.
Support for France’s Defense Spending Increase & NATO-EU Defense Cooperation
Shekerinska also welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron’s announcement to raise France’s defense budget to 3.5% of GDP. She encouraged other NATO member states to follow France’s example in increasing defense investments.
In addition to bilateral discussions, Shekerinska highlighted the importance of complementary and interoperable defense initiatives between NATO and the European Union. She stressed that strengthening military cooperation across the alliance remains essential for maintaining regional security.
"Minsk 3.0" and Security Guarantees for Ukraine
Shekerinska’s reference to "Minsk 3.0" underscores concerns over any new peace deal resembling the previous Minsk agreements, which were widely criticized for enabling Russia to consolidate territorial gains without ensuring Ukraine’s long-term security. The agreements, Minsk I (2014) and Minsk II (2015), failed to produce a lasting resolution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have echoed this stance, emphasizing that any future peace framework must include strong security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent further aggression. According to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), previous ceasefires allowed Russia to maintain influence over Ukraine without committing to genuine peace.
Reflecting on the Minsk Legacy
The original Minsk agreements (Minsk I in 2014 and Minsk II in 2015) were designed to halt fighting in eastern Ukraine. However, as detailed in recent policy research, these accords have largely failed to produce a durable ceasefire or a political settlement. Analysts have highlighted that the agreements allowed the de facto authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk to solidify their quasi-state structures under Russian influence while leaving Ukraine exposed to further security threats. In this light, Shekerinska’s rejection of a “Minsk 3.0” approach signals a broader commitment within NATO to avoid repeating past mistakes that have only deepened divisions and prolonged instability in the Donbas region.
Visit to France’s Strategic Air Base
Before her meetings in Paris, NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska, along with a delegation of NATO representatives, visited Istres-Le Tubé Air Base in southern France. This high-security installation serves as a key hub for the French Air and Space Force (Armée de l'Air et de l'Espace) and plays a crucial role in France’s nuclear deterrence strategy.
During the visit, the delegation received briefings on France’s airborne nuclear capabilities, including its Rafale fighter jets, which are capable of delivering nuclear payloads as part of the country’s independent deterrence posture. The base is home to elements of France’s strategic air command, responsible for maintaining the credibility of the country’s force de frappe (nuclear strike force)—a critical component of NATO’s broader deterrence and defense framework.
Shekerinska’s visit highlighted NATO’s continued emphasis on strategic deterrence and nuclear readiness, particularly as the alliance reassesses its security posture in response to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. The discussions at Istres underscored the importance of maintaining credible nuclear deterrence within NATO while ensuring alignment between national and alliance-wide defense strategies.
Read also about last year's developments on NATO's Eastern flank and the Polish air base in Redzikowo.
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Conclusion
While Shekerinska’s call for avoiding another Minsk-style compromise aims to secure Ukraine’s future, critics argue that escalating military commitments could prolong the conflict and draw European nations deeper into a regional dispute. France’s planned defense spending increase, when seen alongside intensified NATO-EU cooperation, raises questions about whether these measures risk overextending resources. Furthermore, highlighting nuclear deterrence at Istres-Le Tubé Air Base—viewed by some as a provocative stance—may strain relations with Russia rather than encourage a diplomatic resolution. From a more cautious perspective, leaders should carefully assess the long-term implications of additional military aid, mindful of the failures of previous agreements and the ongoing risks to European stability.
For more on the Russia-Ukraine conflict:
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Further Sources: NATO, Defense.gov, Euromaidan, FDD
