Is the Runway Long Enough? Cases For (and Against) the F-16, Gripen and Mirage in Ukraine

Key Developments and Background

The Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) has primarily focused on securing F-16 fighter jets, receiving aircraft from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The F-16s provide a robust multirole platform and access to NATO-compatible weapons systems. However, in September 2024, Sweden’s announcement of its 17th military support package for Ukraine hinted at the eventual availability of JAS 39 Gripen C/D fighters. While no formal decision to transfer Gripens has been made, Sweden has allocated SEK 2.3 billion (EUR 200 million) to preserve Gripen C/D airframes by producing new parts, signaling readiness should conditions align.

Additionally, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced plans to supply Ukraine with Mirage 2000 jets by early 2025. While each aircraft offers unique operational advantages, the current complexities seen with the F-16 highlight the need to critically assess Ukraine’s existing support infrastructure.

The Case for (or against) F-16s: Operational Readiness and Deployment Challenges

Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, have pledged F-16 fighter jets to Kyiv. These F-16AM/BM variants, equipped with improved radar and multi-target tracking systems, are expected to enhance Ukraine's operational readiness, particularly in air-to-air combat scenarios. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy celebrated these arrivals as marking a “new phase” for Ukraine’s air force and its shift toward Western technology, the transition is not without substantial hurdles.

Training Ukrainian pilots and maintenance crews to operate and sustain the F-16s is a time-intensive process, and fully integrating these fighters into combat operations requires extensive logistical support. Key concerns remain about the sustainability of operations, availability of parts, and whether Ukraine’s current air defense infrastructure can reliably support this Western technology. Given that F-16s require longer, well-maintained runways, their flexibility for dispersed deployment in a conflict zone could be limited, especially in regions where infrastructure may be compromised.

While the F-16 commitment represents strong international backing, it also highlights the considerable resource strain and operational demands Ukraine faces in aligning with NATO air force standards. The shift to such advanced systems requires significant upgrades in infrastructure, logistical support, and technical expertise, raising critical questions about the long-term sustainability and practicality of these ambitious upgrades.

Großwald Curated: Gripen vs. F-16 – Capabilities and Suitability for Ukraine

The Gripen C/D and F-16 offer distinct advantages for different combat needs:

• Operational Flexibility: The Gripen is designed for dispersed operations (Agile Combat Employment, or ACE), capable of taking off from short, unpaved runways—an advantage for a Ukrainian air force frequently under Russian missile threat. Gripens require just 700 meters for takeoff, compared to the F-16’s 2,438 meters, enabling greater flexibility in basing locations.
• Pilot Workload and System Integration: The Gripen’s advanced autopilot and autothrottle features ease pilot workload, particularly during complex missions like close air support (CAS). In contrast, many older F-16 models lack these automated systems, requiring continuous pilot input and potentially reducing operational effectiveness under high-stress conditions.
• Weapons Compatibility: The Gripen C/D can integrate NATO-standard munitions, including the Meteor BVRAAM, which could enhance Ukraine’s air superiority capabilities over contested regions. The F-16, while also compatible with NATO armaments, lacks the same level of dispersed operational capability critical for Ukraine’s needs.

Sweden’s Gripen C/D: Agile Combat Employment and Pilot-Friendly Design

Sweden’s JAS 39 Gripen C/D fighters have emerged as a strong candidate for Ukraine’s defense, particularly given the aircraft’s versatility in challenging environments. Sweden’s recent SEK 2.3 billion investment in Gripen C/D parts highlights its commitment to preserving these jets as options for future deployment to Ukraine. Although Sweden prioritizes F-16 integration, it simultaneously establishes a pathway for future Gripen donations.

The Gripen’s operational design stands out for Ukraine’s needs. Unlike the F-16, the Gripen can operate from shorter, less-developed runways (as short as 700 meters), facilitating dispersed operations or Agile Combat Employment (ACE). The Swedish Ministry of Defense has suggested that this capability could provide flexibility in Ukraine's operational tactics, allowing jets to be less reliant on traditional, well-maintained airbases.

Integrating the Gripen into Ukraine's defense framework poses challenges. While the aircraft's autopilot and advanced flight control systems may ease pilot training, these features don’t address the broader, resource-intensive demands of Western aircraft operations. Sustaining a Gripen fleet requires not only trained pilots but also extensive logistical and technical support. Ukraine's current capacity and infrastructure may be strained by these requirements. Effective deployment also relies on reliable supply chains and technical expertise, both of which are uncertain under present conditions.

French Mirage 2000: French Commitment and Compatibility

In October 2024, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced plans to deliver Mirage 2000 jets to Ukraine by early 2025, reinforcing French support for Kyiv’s air defense. As a NATO-standard platform with air-to-ground and anti-electronic warfare capabilities, the Mirage 2000 offers strategic value as Ukraine shifts from Soviet-era aircraft.

While Ukraine’s air force lacks experience with the Mirage, France has committed to training both pilots and maintenance crews. However, integrating the Mirage presents tactical challenges. The aircraft’s strengths in precision air-to-ground operations and anti-electronic warfare align with NATO doctrines, differing from Ukraine’s traditional Soviet tactics. The Mirage’s capabilities are best suited for targeted strike packages aimed at neutralizing key threats, requiring Ukraine to adopt strike package coordination and combined arms operations—demanding changes in both tactics and command structures.

This shift from a focus on air defense to more surgical strike methods and integrated battlefield roles also requires close coordination with ground forces. Ultimately, while the Mirage 2000 brings valuable capabilities, its success will depend on Ukraine’s ability to adapt its doctrines and infrastructure to support the platform effectively.

Großwald Curated: Comparative Analysis: F-16 vs. Gripen vs. Mirage

Each of these aircraft brings specific advantages and limitations:

• F-16: Offers immediate deployment benefits and multi-target radar capabilities but requires extended runway lengths and lacks operational flexibility for dispersed combat.
• Gripen C/D: Designed for rapid deployment from shorter runways, making it highly adaptable to Ukraine’s dispersed operational needs. Its user-friendly design, including autopilot functions and advanced flight controls, reduces pilot fatigue, a crucial advantage for sustained operations.
• Mirage 2000: While slower to deploy, the Mirage’s compatibility with air-ground and anti-electronic warfare systems adds a new layer to Ukraine’s defense architecture.

Strategic Implications and Future Prospects

While a mix of NATO-standard aircraft could increase Ukraine’s flexibility in countering air superiority, the logistical and resource demands of operating these advanced systems may push Ukraine’s support infrastructure to its limits. Each platform—F-16, Gripen, or Mirage—requires distinct logistics, pilot training, and maintenance protocols, raising sustainability concerns.

While the Mirage’s expected 2025 arrival will further test Ukraine’s adaptability following initial F-16 operational challenges, Sweden’s Ministry of Defense has noted that integrating the Gripen would demand extensive preparation. NATO supplies can only offer meaningful, long-term advantages if Ukraine significantly upgrades its infrastructure and adapts its doctrines to fully utilize these platforms. Without such major upgrades, maintaining these systems could become unmanageable.

Sources: Ukrainian Armed Forces, Swedish Ministry of Defense, French Armed Forces, Saab, European Security & Defence (ESD), euro-sd.com, X,